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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review adjudications of the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2 of the Utah Code.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCESRULES OR REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a divorce proceeding involving the paternity of a child, Zachary, born during
the marriage of Kelly and Kimberlee Pearson, and the custody of both Zachary and his
brother, Nicholas.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Courts Below
Respondent Kelly F. Pearson ("Father") commenced divorce proceedings in
December 2000 (R.1). Intervenor Pete D. Thanos ("Thanos") moved to intervene in the
proceedings on January 23,2001, claiming to be the biological father of Zachary, one of the
children born of the marriage (R.37). Concurrently, petitioner Kimberlee Y. Pearson
("Mother") filed a motion requesting that Father be declared to be not the father of Zachary,
and without visitation rights in Zachary. She also requested temporary custody of both
Nicholas and Zachary (R.32). Father opposed both motions and requested that temporary
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custody of the children be awarded to him (R.56). All three motions were heard by
Commissioner Michael S. Evans on February 8,2001 (R.122).
At the hearing, Mother attempted to proffer testimony that Father was not Zachary's
father. Father's objections on the basis of Lord Mansfield's Rule were sustained. Mother
then stipulated that custody should continue as it had since the Pearsons' separation,
namely, that she and Father should continue to share joint legal and physical custody of
Nicholas and Zachary, with the children splitting their time with each parent equally (R.122).
The stipulation was accepted by the court and reduced to order (R.133).
On August 1,2001, Thanos renewed his motion to intervene (R.165), which Father
again opposed (R.222). The motion was heard by Commissioner Evans on August 30,
2001 (R.248). Commissioner Evans found that Thanos had not acknowledged his paternity
of Zachary for more than two years, though he was aware of and believed himself to be
Zachary's biological father, and that Thanos kept his biological connection to Zachary
hidden from others, including his wife of twenty-six years, allowing Zachary to be regarded
as Father's son and to become closely bonded with Father during critical stages of
Zachary's development. Commissioner Evans further found that Thanos had not had
substantial contact with Zachary prior to the initiation of the litigation, that he had not lived
with Zachary in the same household or established a parent-child bond with Zachary, that
he was completely absent from Zachary's life for the first year and a half and had only
incidental contact with him thereafter, that during Thanos's absence Zachary had developed
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critical bonds with his primary caregivers, Father and Mother, and that to permit Thanos to
now be introduced as Zachary's father would be disruptive to the child's stability. Based on
the foregoing, Commissioner Evans concluded that Thanos did not have standing to
challenge the presumption of paternity in favor of Father and that he did not have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing his paternity of Zachary. The
Commissioner's findings and recommendation were subsequently reduced to order (R.671).
Mother and Thanos objected (R.257, R.400).
The trial court heard argument on Mother's and Thanos's objections on December 3,
2001 (R.684). After taking the matter under advisement, the court in a telephone
conference indicated it needed additional information to adequately address the policy
considerations set forth in StatelnreJ.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft").
Therefore, the court appointed Dr. Jill Sanders "to provide the court with an independent
'Schoolcraft evaluation (R.728).'"
Dr. Sanders completed a written report on May 13,2002 (R.860). She stated in the
report that "Kelly Pearson functioned as Zachary's father prior to and following his birth in
September 1999

Zachary identifies Kelly as his father and their attachment is secure,

strong and healthy." (R.862,1f 2.) She further stated that Thanos's contact with Zachary
was minimal until January of 2001, when he began to see Zachary once or twice a month,
that "Zachary identifies Peter as 'Peter'", and that he perceives him to be a familiar
"caregiver" (R.862,J 3).
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Dr. Sanders went on to opine that "[m]ost adopted children spend considerable time
and energy thinking about their biological parents, if not actively seeking to locate them" and
that "psychologically speaking, some relationship between a biological parent and their child
is necessary for the child's normal development." Id. at 4, fl 4. In this sense, she concluded,
"the relationship between Peter and Zachary is essential." Id.
Without addressing the question whether disestablishing Father as Zachary's father
would be disruptive to Zachary, Dr. Sanders stated that "[tfhere is no research that I am
aware of that suggests having two positive father figures has a detrimental impact on a
child" and expressed her view that "Zachary has the opportunity to experience two positive,
important relationships with the two fathers in his life." Id. at 5, fl 2. She concluded, in
summary, that "[f]rom a developmental and psychological perspective, Zachary's functioning
is not inherently disrupted by Peter's involvement and Peter's relationship with Zachary is
necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development." Id. at 5,1f 4.
Upon receiving Dr. Sanders' report, Father requested that Dr. Sanders address the
impact on Zachary of a disruption in the parent-child relationship between Father and
Zachary, which she had not done. Dr. Sanders refused to do so. Father therefore
requested a telephone conference with the court, which was held May 28,2002 (R.847).
The trial court permitted Father to outline his concerns in a letter to the court, which he did
(R.876). Dr. Sanders responded with a letter stating that she intended to address the
issues raised by Father in the custody evaluation and did not deem it necessary to address
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them in the context of the "Schoolcraft evaluation" (Ex. 1-3). The trial court subsequently
requested Dr. Sanders to address the issues raised by Father, and she responded to this
request with a letter dated August 26,2002 (R.865). In the letter, Dr. Sanders stated:
"Zachary's emotional security would likely be significantly disrupted in the case of severely
limited or complete loss of contact with [Father]

Obviously the way to protect Zachary

from additional disruption is to maintain his relationship with [Father]." (R.866, ffl[ 2-3.)
Dr. Sanders went on to state: "I do not believe Zachary has lost' his relationship
with [Father]. To the contrary, their relationship is a strong and positive parent-child
attachment

There is no basis to believe that further disruption to the relationship

between Zachary and [Father] is intrinsically linked to [Thanos's] presence in Zachary's life."
id., If 5. Thereafter, the matter was submitted for decision (R.857).
After one-hour oral argument on October 1,2002, and without taking testimony, but
relying solely on the affidavits and written reports previously filed with the court, the trial
court granted Thanos's motion to intervene (R.894). The trial court instructed counsel for
Thanos to "prepare the Order consistent with the Court's ruling" (R.894), but instead
counsel submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.975), and a separate order
(R.971), which were signed over petitioner's objection on November 7,2002 (R.933).
The matter was subsequently set for a six-day trial on the issues of custody, alimony
and attorney fees. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court took the matter under
advisement, subsequently issuing written findings of fact (R. 2434) and entering a
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supplemental decree of divorce (R.2503). Based on its previous paternity ruling, the court
concluded that Father was a non-parent competing for custody of Zachary vis-a-vis
Zachary's parents, and he was therefore required to rebut the parental presumption. As to
Mother, the court found that Father had not done so, and thus "[Mother] benefits from the
Parental Presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against [Father]. Consequently,
[Mother] and [Father] are not on equal footing." (R.2452).
As to Thanos, the court found: "The Parental Presumption has been rebutted
regarding [Thanos's] claim for custody of Zachary. During approximately the first 15 months
of Zachary's life, [Thanos], with the assistance of [Mother and Father], kept [Thanos's]
parentage of Zachary a secret resulting in minimal contact between Zachary and [Thanos]
during this period. During this critical 15-month period of time, [Thanos] and Zachary
generally did not have a strong mutual bond, during this time [Thanos] did not demonstrate
a willingness to sacrifice his own interests and welfare for Zachary, and generally lacked the
sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally.
Therefore, [Father] and [Thanos] stand on equal foot and Zachary's custody between them
is determined solely by the best interests of the child." (R.2452).
Additionally, the trial court found, "In the context of the Parental Presumption
Analysis, it is ironic at best to conclude that [Father] is a non-parent of Zachary when in real
terms [Father] has established a strong mutual parental bond and relationship with Zachary,
albeit in loco parentis. The Utah Supreme Court deemed Mr. Hutchison to be a 'non-parent'
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in its analysis and Mr. Hutchison's parental relationship was of longer duration than
[Father's] in the present case. 649 P.2d at 39. Consequently, following the dictates of the
Hutchison case and in furtherance of the policies which support the Parental Presumption,
the Court ruled accordingly." (R.2452-53).
Adopting the recommendations set forth in Dr. Jill Sanders' custody evaluation, the
trial court awarded joint legal custody of Zachary to Mother and Thanos, denying Father
legal custody rights in Zachary, and joint legal custody of Nicholas to Father and Mother
(R.2467). The court designated Mother and Thanos primary physical custodians of
Zachary, and Mother primary physical custodian of Nicholas. Father was awarded "third
party access" to Zachary and his 50/50 access schedule, in place since the parties'
separation, was reduced. Father and Mother's 50/50 access schedule with Nicholas
remained unchanged (R. 2459; R.2467; R.2504, fl 4). Father's physical access schedule
with both Nicholas and Zachary was made contingent upon Father relocating to Oregon
(R.2505,1f 6; R.2507, f 7).
Statement of Facts
Father and Mother were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 17,1992. Their
first son, Nicholas, was born July 6,1997. Unbeknownst to Father, commencing in 1996
and continuing thereafter through Nicholas's birth and infancy, and Zachary's conception,
Mother was involved romantically with Thanos (R.74, fflf 4-6). Thanos was also married at
the time, and Mother and Thanos concealed their relationship from their respective spouses
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(R.74, fflj 4-6). Mother became pregnant towards the end of 1998. In January 1999 she
told Thanos that she believed the child was his. Thanos refused to leave his wife and was
unwilling to be known or recognized as the child's father (R.2535, at 961:14 - 962:25; R.74,

UK 4-6).
Thereafter, in late March 1999, Mother told Father of the pregnancy and of the
affair. She was four months pregnant by this time (R.2532, at 433:1; R.45,1f 4). When
Mother told Father that she was pregnant, she stated that she believed Thanos was the
child's biological father. Father and Mother then discussed the viability of their marriage,
and Mother stated that she must decide whether to stay with Father or to leave the
marriage. She asked Father whether, if she stayed, he would rear the child as his own,
making no distinction between him and their older son. Father affirmed that he would
(R.2532, at 433:12 - 435:2; R.1570, If 4).
The following day after this discussion took place, Mother told Father that she had
decided she would stay and make their marriage work (R.2532, at 435:3 - 436:8; R.1570,
ffl[ 4-6). From that point forward, Mother repeatedly confirmed to Father that she
considered him to be the father of the child she was carrying and that she would treat him
as such in all respects (R.2533, at 450:8 - 452:8; R.1570, ffl[ 4-6). Mother expressed her
fear that Father would not treat the child as his own, and she repeatedly asked Father for
assurance that he would, which Father gave. Id. Mother also confided to Father that

8

Thanos was unwilling to do anything that would reveal the situation to his wife and that he
wanted the child's paternity to remain secret (R.2533, at 456:5-11; R.1570, fl 4).
Relying on Mother's repeated representations and assurances, Father took on the
commitment of fatherhood and was as involved in the pregnancy as a father can be, caring
for and supporting Mother, attending all prenatal examinations with her, and shouldering
increased household duties to relieve Mother during the pregnancy (R.2532, at 438:16 439:12; R.45,ffl 5-8; R.1570, U 9).
After the child, Zachary, was born, Mother resumed her full work schedule, leaving
Father with the lion's share of the responsibility for both Zachary and Nicholas (R.457:2-6).
She had by this time been working for several months in a high management position for
the startup company by which she'd been recruited (R.2533, at 459:14). She worked long
hours during the week, typically leaving by 8:00 a.m. and not returning until 7:00 or
8:00 p.m. or later. She also worked full days on Saturdays and 4 to 6 hours on Sundays,
jd. at 457:1-15. Father, on the other hand, consciously stepped back in his career in order
to care for the children (R.2532, at 431:1-17). He maintained a schedule of working 8:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and he did not work over-time or weekends
(R.2533, at 457:20 - 458:4). He was involved in all aspects of the children's care. ]d. at
458:7 - 459:23. He was the one who took Nicholas to school in the morning, and he was
the one who arrived home in the evening to relieve the nanny (R.2535, at 1071:11-15).
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Mother never acted inconsistently with her commitment to Father as Zachary's
father until this litigation began (R.2533, at 452:12). She listed Father as Zachary's father
on his birth certificate. The papers were filled out by both Father and Mother together after
Zachary was born (R.2533, at 453:14 & Ex. P-9; R. 1570,1f 9 & 1580). Father chose
Zachary's given name because Mother had chosen Nicholas's given name (R.2533, at
454:4-10). Father and Mother both agreed without question that Zachary's surname would
be "Pearson" (R. 1570, U10).
When Zachary was 6 weeks old both Father's family and Mother's family gathered
to bless Zachary as a member of the LDS Church. It was announced that Kelly Pearson,
Zachary's father, would give Zachary his name and a blessing, and Father did so with
members of both families participating. After the blessing, Mother spoke from the pulpit and
expressed the joy that she felt to welcome Zachary into their family. Mother completed the
form for Zachary's Blessing Certificate, signed by the Pearsons' bishop, stating that Father
is Zachary's father and that he blessed him (R. 2533, at 454:11 - 455:23 & Ex. P-10;
R.1570,1f 11 & R.1581, R.1582). The Pearson's church membership record confirms that
Zachary was "born in the covenant" and is therefore sealed to Father as his father for all
time and eternity (R.1570, H12 & R.1583).
Even after Father and Mother separated and Mother moved from the Pearsons'
marital home in May 2000, she continued to act consistently with her repeated
representations to Father that she considered him to be Zachary's father. She left both

10

Zachary and Nicholas with Father while she established herself in a new residence, and
thereafter acquiesced in Father caring for both children in the home during the day while
she worked. She established jointly with Father a 50/50 time-sharing schedule to care for
Nicholas and Zachary, which continued through September of 2004, at which point the trial
court's time-sharing schedule took effect (R.2434, at 16, fl 34.d; R. 1570, fl 13).
It was not until January 2001, when divorce proceedings commenced, that Mother
changed her position regarding Father's paternity of Zachary. At that time she filed a
motion with the court asking that the court declare that Father was not Zachary's father and
that he had no rights of custody or visitation in Zachary (R.32).
Nevertheless, while taking this position in court papers, respondent continued to
represent Father as Zachary's father in public forums and to acquiesce in his ongoing
assumption of the role of Zachary's father. At Zachary's pre-school, which Zachary started
in the Fall of 2002, respondent listed Zachary's home phone as "Dad - 467-8923", Father
home phone, and his grandparents as "Velda and Wayne", Father's parents (R.1570, If 15 &
R.1587). Father is listed as Zachary's father at work, at Zachary's school, on the church
records, and in this state's vital records (R.1570, K14 & R. 1580-91).
Thanos also acquiesced in Father's assumption of the role of Zachary's father.
Knowing of Zachary's existence before even petitioner did, and believing himself to be
Zachary's father from the time he learned of Mother's pregnancy in January 1999, he
allowed petitioner to assume that role for two full years, doing nothing to acknowledge his
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paternity (R.2535, at 963:1; R.671, If 9). He felt that he would be "Uncle Pete" to Zachary
rather than father, yet he acquiesced in that occurring (R.2535, at 964:8-16; R.2536, at
1302:21 -1303:21; R.449, at 2, fl4). He kept his biological connection to Zachary hidden
from others, including his family members, until as late as August 2001 (R. 671, f 9).
Despite his belief and knowledge that he was Zachary's biological father, Thanos allowed
Zachary to be regarded in every way as Father's son and to become closely bonded with
Father during critical stages of Zachary's development, jd.; R.2452-53.
Thanos's desire to keep Zachary's parentage secret also resulted in minimal
contact between Zachary and Thanos during these critical stages (R.2452). During the first
year of Zachary's life, Thanos saw him twice, each time about an hour (R.2535, at 964:1721). During the second year of Zachary's life, until February 2001, he saw him two to three
times (R.2535, at 964:22-25).
On December 25,2000, Thanos's wife died (R.2533, at 635:20). Beginning in
February 2001, Thanos began to have contact with Zachary and Nicholas during the
periods of time that the children were in Mother's custody (R.2437, fl 9). Zachary was
seventeen months old by this time. The contact consisted of approximately the equivalent
of standard visitation for a noncustodial parent (R.2534, at 716:8). Intervenor continued to
live in Oregon through the time of trial (R.2437, fl 8).
Nicholas and Zachary make no distinction between themselves in their relationship
with Thanos, identifying him as step-father and calling him "Pete" (R.2535, at 950). To both
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children, Thanos is a stepparent, not a parent (R.2534, at 711:17). Nor do Nicholas and
Zachary make any distinction between themselves in their relationship with Father,
identifying him as their father and calling him "Dad" (R.2434, at 19). Nicholas and Zachary's
primary attachment figures are Father and Mother (R.2534, at 715:11,716:18). They have
a "secondary" attachment to Thanos (R.2534, at 716:14).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals was not required to defer to the trial court's application of the
facts bearing on the standing inquiry in this case, nor to the trial court's findings of fact, as
the former analysis involves policy questions and legal conclusions that are the proper
province of the appellate courts, and the latter were based on the trial court's review of the
written record only, which the Court of Appeals was equally well situated to review.
The Court of Appeals did not err in applying the standing analysis set forth by this
Court in State In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft") to the facts of this
case. The Court of Appeals properly took a broader view of the policy concern of protecting
marriage than was taken by the trial court - concluding that the policy concern did not lose
all relevance simply because the Pearsons' marriage ultimately dissolved. This is
particularly so in light of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, enacted in this state in 2005,
which departs from the Uniform Act by denying standing to adjudicate the paternity of a
marital child to anyone but the husband or wife, even in the context of divorce proceedings.
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Thanos does not have a constitutionally protected right to establish his paternity of a
child born into Father's marriage. Even if he did have such a constitutionally protected right,
he waived it by failing to timely assert it.
The Court of Appeals' references to the findings of the trial court in its October 2001
order were immaterial to its opinion. The essential findings - though not the conclusions were subsequently confirmed by Dr. Sanders' reports. The Court of Appeals correctly relied
on the findings contained in Dr. Sanders' reports, rejecting her superfluous conclusions, in
applying the policy concern of protecting children from disruptive attacks on their paternity.
The Court of Appeals' opinion is not ambiguous in its implications for the trial court's
custody determinations in this case, and on remand the trial court should be instructed that
Father is entitled to a new custody evaluation and a new custody trial, free from the
inclusion of an improper third party and based on proper custody factors, not "biology."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT IN SCHOOLCRAFT
Mother and Thanos (collectively "Petitioners") articulate numerous reasons why they

feel the Court of Appeals "wholly disregarded" the policy considerations articulated by this
Court in InreJ.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft") and should be reversed.
Petitioners' arguments do not accurately convey the court of appeals' opinion, slant the
record facts, cite facts inapposite to the Schoolcraft analysis, and assume erroneous
standards of review. Father responds to the arguments advanced by Petitioners as follows.
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A.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err In Its Review of Thanos's
Standing to Challenge Zacharv's Paternity, Nor In Its Review of
the Facts Bearing on This Issue

Petitioners argue, in relation to several substantive points, that the Court of Appeals
erroneously substituted its own findings of fact for findings of the trial court. Petitioners cite
Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226,234 (Utah 1997), an alimony case in which the trial court
made findings of fact after trial, in support of this argument. The principle articulated in
Willev - that the appellate court must not usurp the prerogative of the trial court and make
its own independent determinations - does not apply in this case.
The Court of Appeals addressed only one issue raised in Father's appeal, namely,
whether the trial court erred in the standing analysis it employed in granting Thanos's
motion to intervene. As this Court has stated, "The question of whether a given individual or
association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although
there may be factual findings that bear on the issue." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson.
946 P.2d 372,373 (Utah 1997). The standing determination implicates important policy
considerations, as to which trial courts are granted minimal discretion, jd. at 374; cf. State
v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,281 (Utah 1994) (determining normative consequence of
particular facts is the province of appellate courts). Thus, in contrast to Willev where the
trial court was entitled to "considerable discretion" in fashioning an alimony award, see
Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226,234 (Utah 1997), the trial court's determinations regarding
the important policy considerations implicated in this case were not entitled to deference.
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Moreover, the trial court's factual findings pertaining to the issue of standing - while
normally entitled to deference, see Kearns-Tribune Corp.. 946 P.2d at 373-74 - were not
entitled to deference in this case. This is because the trial court decided the question of
standing based solely on the affidavits and legal memoranda filed by the parties and the
reports submitted by Dr. Sanders. The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing,
receive testimony, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor make findings resolving
conflicting testimony. Thus, the Court of Appeals was in as good a position as the trial court
to read the affidavits and reports, evaluate the evidence, and draw logical conclusions
therefrom. See Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333,336-37 & n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The
Court of Appeals was not required to defer to the trial court's findings on the motion to
intervene, see In re Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916,918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and was
instead entitled to review the facts pertaining to the motion to intervene de novo. See
Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc.. 758 P.2d 460,461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Petitioners' oft-repeated contention that the Court of Appeals did not properly defer to the
trial court's findings and/or substituted findings of its own is grounded in a misapprehension
of the foregoing principles and should be disregarded.1

1

Petitioners also attempt to dispute "findings" made by the Court of Appeals by citation to
testimony adduced at trial. However, the motion for intervention was granted nearly two
years prior to trial and conclusively disposed of the standing issue. At no time did the trial
court take evidence or receive testimony prior to ruling on the motion for intervention, nor,
clearly did the trial court rely on testimony adduced at trial two years later to make its ruling.
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B.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Its Application of the Policy
Consideration of "Preserving the Stability of the Marriage"

1.

The Court of Appeals appropriately took a broad view of the
policy goal of preserving marriage.

Neither Schoolcraft, nor any other reported case in this jurisdiction, has involved a
challenge to the paternity of a child born into the marriage of a husband and wife who,
believing the child is not the issue of the husband, agree that the husband will rear the child
as his own as a condition of reconciling and continuing the marriage. The Court of Appeals
did not err in determining that, under these facts, the policy consideration of preserving the
stability of marriage does not lose all relevance, even though the particular marriage at
issue had since dissolved.
In making this determination, the Court of Appeals did not "find" that the Pearsons'
marriage was intact, nor that a stable marriage between them existed, nor that Thanos was
"at fault" in undermining the Pearsons' marital relationship, as petitioners claim. Rather, the
Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that the Pearsons' marriage eventually dissolved.
See Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, U 21. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
properly recognized the importance of the Pearsons' efforts to reconcile and to jointly rear
Zachary as the child of their marriage, both prior to and after their separation.
In the context of this case, the policy of protecting marriage takes on broader
implications than were present in Schoolcraft. The Pearsons, unlike Mr. Schoolcraft and his
wife, who lived together for eight months and separated before any children were born of
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their union, lived together for eight years and jointly participated in the rearing of two
children. They subsequently separated, but continued to rear both of the children of their
marriage jointly, albeit in separate households. The Pearsons' was not a marriage "in name
only." As noted by the Florida Court of Appeals, "although divorce may separate and strain
a family with children, divorce does not end the important child-rearing functions of the
family." S.D. v. A.G.and J.G.. 764 So. 2d 807,810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000).
The presumption of legitimacy protects not only the tranquility of an existing marriage
and the legitimacy of children born into a marriage, but also the sanctity of parent-child
relationships that develop in the context of marriage. From the standpoint of the child born
into a marriage, the protection that is afforded by the presumption of legitimacy does not
depend on the continued existence of the marriage, but to the contrary, acquires particular
relevance when the marriage dissolves. Our sister state so recognized in In re Marriage of
Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), where the court emphasized: "The state's
interest in applying the [conclusive] presumption [that the husband is the father of children
born into his marriage] is not limited to assuring adequate support for a child or protecting
existing marriages from interference. Rather, as we have noted, the state has a wellrecognized interest in preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships,
especially when a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a
child's life." Jd. at 448: see also Susan H. v. Jack S.. 30 Cal. App. 4 * 1435,1442-1443
(1994)("The state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child
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and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and
stability.' This interest is served notwithstanding termination of the mother's marital
relationship with the presumed father.").
The importance of the marital family as the basic unit of society is grounded in large
part on the role that marriage plays in nurturing young children. "A child's psychological tie
to a parent is not a simple, uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his parents not
only bodily comfort and gratification, but also demands affection, companionship, and
stimulating intimacy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly by the parent,
the child-parent relationship becomes firm, with immensely productive effects on the child's
intellectual and social development. Where there are changes of the parent figure or other
hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become
evident." See In re Marriage of Ross. 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) (citing Goldstein,
Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. 17-20)
Thus, while genetic testing has become scientifically reliable to the extent that even
the highest standard of proof required to rebut the presumption can be met, courts have
nevertheless sustained the mandate of privileging the marital family and protecting children
from disruption of the relationships developed within it. In California, the courts sustained
the presumption from the attack that it no longer bore a reasonable relationship to the facts
sought to be presumed by designating it a substantive rule of law. See In re Marriage of
Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 ("'A conclusive presumption is in actuality a substantive
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rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it transcends such a power of
the Legislature."') (quoting Kusior v. Silver. 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960)). This Court has also
recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is grounded not in considerations of fact, but
in public policy. See Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah
1965) ("[T]he so-called absolute presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is
based on considerations of public policy rather than absolute certainty as to fact."). The
stability of the parent-child relationships that are formed within marriage are of ongoing
significance to the well-being of society and as such are entitled to the ongoing protection of
the state, though the union between the husband and the wife dissolves.
In this case, the trial court's finding that "the interest in preserving the stability of the
marriage is not a consideration, due to the fact that there is no marriage to preserve,"
R.983,1f 21, employs an extremely narrow view of the policy goal of preserving marriage.
Father agreed to reconcile with Mother, and as part of that reconciliation promised to raise
the child she had conceived of an affair with another man as his own. After having done so,
and investing emotionally, financially, and in every other way in the child, Mother changed
her mind, decided she would rather be with Thanos, and asserted that Father had no
parental rights in the child that he had reared. The trial court endorsed this assertion,
allowing Thanos standing to disestablish Father as the child's father, and ultimately
depriving Father of legal custody rights in the child, allowing him only physical access rights
as a non-parent "third party". Were the trial court's ruling to be upheld, any husband who

20

finds himself in Father's position would be foolish to attempt reconciliation conditioned on a
promise to rear the child as his own, knowing that the relationship he establishes with the
child will be at the whim of the wife. Such a policy undermines marriage by discouraging
reconciliation. Further, such a policy favors the rights of men who invade marriages and
procreate with the wives of others, thus destabilizing marriages. The policy goal of
preserving marriage can and should include fashioning rules of law that promote the stability
of marriage by protecting instead the rights of husbands who attempt to preserve their
marriages by parenting the children born into them.2
The Court of Appeals did not err in applying a broader perspective to the policy goal
of preserving marriage to the facts of this case, disagreeing with the trial court's assumption
that this policy goal loses all relevance when the particular marriage at issue ends in
divorce. The stability of marriage is promoted by a rule of law that gives legal protection to
the parent-child relationship that developed as a condition of the continuation of the
marriage, and ensuring that that legal protection survives subsequent separation or divorce.
The dissolution of the marriage between the legal father and the mother "does not change
the preferred principle, which is to preserve the child's relationship with the social father, if

2

The concept that rules of law that protect marriage may have continuing application, even
though a particular marriage has dissolved, is evident elsewhere in our laws. An example is
Rule 502 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which protects spousal confidential
communications after divorce, and even after death. See Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce,
Utah Evidence Law, 5-148 (2 nd ed. 2004). The survival of the privilege, encourages open
communication between spouses, thus protecting and promoting marriage, while having no
positive benefit in application to the particular marriage that has dissolved.
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there is one." Ira M. Ellman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father
Families, 36 Fam. L.Q. 49,64-65 (2002); see also Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4th
1435,1442-43 (1994); Steven W. v. Matthew S.. 33 Cal. App. 4th 1108,1116-17 (1995)
(holding that extant father-child relationship should be preserved at cost of biological ties,
though presumed father's relationship with mother had ended). The Court of Appeals
merely recognized that these broader implications are legitimately considered when
analyzing the first policy consideration identified in Schoolcraft.
2.

The Court of Appeals' application of the policy goal of
preserving marriage is consistent with the policies expressed in
the Uniform Parentage Act enacted in Utah in 2005.

Petitioners cite a random selection of dated cases from other jurisdictions in support
of the false assertion that "it is increasingly apparent that the presumption of paternity rule is
being further eroded and limited." In fact, the opposite is true, as evidenced by the revisions
to the Uniform Parentage Act completed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 2000, as amended in 2002 ("Uniform Act"). The Uniform Act
incorporates, inter alia, a strict limitations period and the doctrine of estoppel to all
challenges to the paternity of children having a presumed father. See Uniform Act, §§ 607
& 608. It thus incorporates legal principles developed by courts throughout the country to
address complexities arising from social and scientific developments that have resulted in
an increased need to assign legal paternity where there is knowledge of a divergence
between social and biological paternity. See Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking about Custody and

22

Support in Ambiguous-Father Families. 36 Fam. L. Q. 49,51-55 (2002). Professor Ellman
states:
Legal paternity and biological paternity have never been identical. That was
once inevitable; today it is a matter of choice. Particularly as policymakers
have become more determined to enforce child support obligations, the
choice becomes more important. Even though the law's historic emphasis on
social paternity owed much to scientific ignorance, it often produced sensible
results. Those results should not be displaced by our new-found ability to
establish biological paternity.
Id. at 77. That sentiment is echoed by the Michigan Supreme Court's holding in In re CAW.
665 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 2003) that a biological father did not have standing to intervene in a
child protective proceeding in which the child involved had a legal father. The court stated:
"There is much that benefits society and, in particular, the children of our state, by a legal
regime that presumes the legitimacy of children born during a marriage."
Different legal principles have developed to address the question of legal paternity
where the social father and the biological father are the not the same. "The key things we
learn from all these cases . . . is that the rights and obligations of parentage appropriately
arise from relationships, not just from biology." Ellman, supra, at 65. Schoolcraft, by
application of a standing analysis that mandates attention to policy considerations protecting
marriage and children before paternity of a child who has a legal father may be contested,
simply makes use of one such legal tool. Other states have also employed standing
analyses, see, e.g.. Ex parte Presse. 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989): Nostrand v. Olivieri. 427
So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Family Independence Agency v. Jefferson. 677
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N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004); Girard v. Waoenmaker. 470 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1991); Evans v.
Bisson. 970 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1998), have required that a full evidentiary hearing be
conducted prior to blood tests being ordered or considered or paternity being determined,
see, e.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000); Fernandez v. McKennev. 776 So. 2d
1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), have weighed the competing interests at stake per their
statutory schemes, see, e.g.. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) or have employed
estoppel principles, see, e.g.. In re Marriage of Sleeper. 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
The version of the Uniform Act adopted by this State incorporates the foregoing
principles, and additionally, re-affirms the strong public policy in Utah of protecting marriage
from outside intervention. Thus, whereas the Uniform Act permits a presumed father, the
mother, "or another individual" to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed
father within two years of the child's birth, see Uniform Act § 607(a), the version of the
Uniform Act adopted in this State does not allow "another individual" to adjudicate the
parentage of a child having a presumed father. Instead, the Utah Uniform Parentage Act,
codified at Title 78, Chapter 45(g) of the Utah Code, allows the issue to be raised only by
"the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the
pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607
(2006). Individuals outside the marriage, including putative fathers, may not adjudicate the
paternity of a child of the marriage, even at the time of the divorce of the mother and the
presumed father.
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In light of the foregoing expression of this State's public policy regarding the
protection of marriage and the presumption of paternity from outside challenges, even
during divorce proceedings, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the first prong of the Schoolcraft test should not have been dismissed by the trial court
as irrelevant under the facts of this case.
C.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Its Application of the Policy
Consideration of "Protecting Children From Disruptive and
Unnecessary Attacks upon Their Paternity"

Petitioners again argue, in the context of the second policy consideration articulated
by this Court in Schoolcraft, that the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it
"rejected the unchallenged findings of the trial court and made findings of its own." Brief of
Appellants, at 33. The essential facts in this case that bear on the policy consideration of
protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity are clear and
undisputed and were not rejected by the Court of Appeals. These facts are that Mother,
Father and Thanos, with knowledge of Thanos's probable biological paternity of Zachary,
concurred in Father taking on the role of father to Zachary, that Father did in fact take on
that role, that Father and Zachary developed a strong father-child bond during critical
stages in Zachary's development, that that father-child bond remained intact though Father
and Mother subsequently separated and Thanos was introduced into Zachary's life, and that
Zachary came to identify Thanos as "another loving caregiver", not his father. These facts
are set forth in Dr. Sanders' "Schoolcraft" reports submitted prior to the October 1,2002
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hearing on Thanos's motion to intervene and the parties' affidavits submitted in support of
and opposition to the motion. See R.28, fl8; R.46, ffl[ 3-7, fl 11-12; R.75, fflj 2-8; R.860-68.
The essential facts remained unchanged nearly two years later, when the trial court
found that Thanos, with Mother and Father's assistance, kept Thanos's parentage of
Zachary secret during the first 15 months of Zachary's life, that this resulted in minimal
contact between Thanos and Zachary during this time, that Thanos and Zachary did not
have a strong mutual bond during this critical 15-month period of time, that Thanos did not
demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own interests and welfare for Zachary during this
time, and that during this time he generally lacked the sympathy for and understanding of
Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally (R.2452), and that "it is ironic at best to
conclude that [Father] is a non-parent of Zachary when in real terms [Father] has
established a strong mutual parental bond and relationship with Zachary." (R.2452-53.)
The trial court made these findings despite the fact that Mother and Thanos had
since married and established an "intact family unit" with Nicholas, Zachary and another
child born to Mother and Thanos after their marriage. Though Zachary was certainly part of
this household, Father and Mother remained Nicholas and Zachary's primary parental
figures, while Thanos remained in a secondary, or step-parent role, to both Nicholas and
Zachary. The testimony at trial establishing the continuing role of Father as father and
Thanos as "another loving caregiver" or step-parent came from Petitioners' witness, Dr. Jill
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Sanders, and was unrefuted. See R.2534. at 711:17-18; R.2534, at 718:18-20; R.2534, at
719:7-16; R.2534, at 738:11-13; R.2534, at 796:5-9.
The only "facts" rejected by the Court of Appeals, which Petitioners argue should
bear on the second prong of the standing analysis are not facts at all, but speculation
regarding the role that Thanos might play or should be able to play in Zachary's life in the
future due to his biological paternity of Zachary. Dr. Sanders' summary opinion that "some
relationship between a biological parent and their child is necessary for the child's normal
development" (R.863,1f 4), which led her to conclude that "Peter's relationship with Zachary
is necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development" (R.864, fl 4), falls in this
category. It is not a fact, but a conclusion, based on Dr. Sanders' generalized opinion that
all children - not Zachary Pearson in particular - must have a relationship with their
biological parent to develop normally. If this view is translated into policy, then the second
prong of the Schoolcraft standing analysis becomes superfluous in any case in which a
biological father wishes to assert his paternity in a child having a presumed father.
The Court of Appeals, correctly, did not treat Dr. Sanders' idiosyncratic view as a
"fact" bearing on the standing analysis. It also correctly characterized Dr. Sanders' focus in
her reports on Thanos's presence in Zachary's life, rather than Thanos's direct attack on
Father's paternity of Zachary, and the potential that such an attack had to disrupt the
relationship between Father and Zachary, as being nonresponsive to the second policy
concern identified by this Court in Schoolcraft. See Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128,
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H 24, n.6. Dr. Sanders, in fact, attempted to avoid the whole question of disruption by
ignoring the reality that Thanos's paternity challenge would render Father a "non-parent" to
Zachary. Thus, Dr. Sanders opined that Zachary had not lost his relationship with Father,
that "[t]here is no inherent reason why the presence of Mr. Thanos as another loving
caretaker should have any further disruptive impact on Zachary's relationship with Mr.
Pearson," R.866, fl 2, and that Thanos's intervention was an opportunity for Zachary "to
experience two positive, important relationships with the two fathers in his life." R.864, ^ 2.
The Court of Appeals properly rejected these views as nonresponsive to the
question that needed to be addressed, instead focusing on Dr. Sanders' findings that were
responsive. These findings are that "Zachary's emotional security would likely be
significantly disrupted in the case of severely limited or complete loss of contact with
[Father]," R.866,1| 2, that "[o]bviously, the way to protect Zachary from additional disruption
is to maintain his relationship with [Father]," R.866, % 3, that Zachary and Father's
relationship "is a strong and positive parent-child attachment," and that Zachary considers
Father his father and Thanos "an additional caregiver." (R.867, ^ 2).
Whatever the merits of Dr. Sanders' "two-father" view, the issue before the court was
not whether Thanos could be a secondary father to Zachary. Clearly, by virtue of his
marriage to Mother, Thanos is at liberty to attempt to foster whatever type of relationship
with Zachary he wishes to foster, and would be expected most naturally to develop as a
father figure to both Zachary and Nicholas. As the Court of Appeals' correctly observed,
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however, "[t]he entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to intervene was to establish that he,
rather than Father, was to fulfill the paternal role in [Zachary's] life." Pearson v. Pearson,
2006 UT App 128, K 28. Thanos's challenge is not for the purpose of being introduced as
another father figure in Zachary's life, but for the sole purpose of displacing Father as such.
The Court of Appeals' penetration through Dr. Sanders' generalized views regarding
biological parents and their children and her "two-father" model, and its focus instead on the
relevant findings in her report, was clearly not error, but necessary to the proper application
of Schoolcraft in the context of this case.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' approach is in line with this State's clearly
articulated policy of ensuring the early identification of persons who will be fulfilling the
parental role for children, and the protection and fostering of children's uninterrupted
bonding with these parents. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984);
InreJ.M.&N.P., 940 P.2d 527, 539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
In the context of children born outside of marriage, this Court has stated:
It is and should be the policy of the law to so operate as to encourage the
finding of suitable homes and parents for children in that need. It is obvious
that persons who might be willing to accept a child for adoption will be more
reluctant to do so if a consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change her
mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate the plan of the adoptive
parents and bring to naught all of their time, effort, expense and emotional
involvement.
See ig\(quoting In re Adoption of F.. 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971). Moreover, our
legislature has found:
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(a) The state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent
homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption
of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the
needs of children;
(c) Adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive
placements;
(d) Adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy
interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and
(e) An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and
upon the child's birth
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2006).
It is no less essential in the context of children born into marriage than in the context
of children born outside of marriage to provide permanence and stability to the parent-child
relationship. To adopt a policy that allows the legal relationship between a father and his
three-year-old son3 to be severed by a paternity challenge from a biological father who
demonstrated neither a timely nor full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood is to
afford marital fathers less protection than prospective adoptive parents, and to afford
children born into marriage less permanence and stability than children born outside of
marriage. Marital children are entitled to the same protection and the same permanence in
the relationships they develop with the persons who actually function as their parents as are
non-marital children.

3

Zachary had just turned three when the trial court granted Thanos's motion to intervene for
the purpose of establishing his paternity of Zachary.
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As the trial court found, Father is Zachary's father "in real terms". R.2452. The
Court of Appeals' application of the second prong of Schoolcraft standing analysis to the
facts of this case ensured that Father, who has functioned as Zachary's father from birth,
and who continues to do so, remains the child's father legally, thus protecting Zachary from
disruption in that relationship, and ensuring Zachary the "early and swift" permanence to
which children in this State are ideally entitled. This was not a misinterpretation of the
policy concern that this Court articulated in Schoolcraft, of protecting children from
disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity, but a vindication of it.
D.

Thanos Does Not have a Constitutionally Protected Right to
Challenge Zachary's Paternity

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals' application of the Schoolcraft analysis to
the facts of this case resulted in a denial of Thanos's due process rights. In determining
whether an asserted interest is a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process, the
interest sought to be protected must first be carefully defined. See Dawn P. v. Superior
Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. 4*h 932,940 (Cal. 1998). In this case, the trial court
concluded, without analysis, that "[b]oth the U.S. and Utah Constitutions grant Peter Thanos
constitutional rights afforded to a natural parent." R.975, f 23. This description of Thanos's
interest is inaccurate. Thanos does not claim an interest simply as an alleged "natural
parent." He claims an interest as the alleged biological father of a child born into the
marriage of another man who is deemed the child's father by operation of law upon birth.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2. The constitutional significance of his claim is therefore
31

distinct from that of other unwed fathers. The constitution requires some protection of the
biological father's opportunity, which no other male possesses, to develop a relationship
with his offspring. "Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the
natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage." Michael H. v. Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110,129 (1989). Thus, to
expand the "liberty" afforded Thanos is to contract the equivalent liberty of Father, or as
Justice Scalia framed it: "[T]o provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny
protection to a marital father." id. at 130.
Carefully described, therefore, the interest Thanos claims is constitutionally
protected is his interest in disestablishing Father as the legal father of a child born to
Father's intact marriage, where the child has a fully developed and unquestioned fatherchild relationship with Father, to have himself declared the father of the child. Once the
asserted interest is identified, the court must next determine whether the interest
denominated as a "liberty" is a fundamental right traditionally protected by our society and
rooted in history, tradition and the conscience of our people. See Michael H. v. Gerald P.,
491 U.S. 110,123 (1989)("[T]he Pue Process Clause affords only those protections 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'")
(quoting Snvder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)). Only if the liberty interest is
fundamental is it necessary to conduct a complex balancing of competing interests. See
Pawn P., 17 Cal.4' h at 940-41.
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It is Thanos's burden to establish that the interest he has in disestablishing Father as
Zachary's legal father to have his paternity declared is so deeply embedded within our
traditions as to be a fundamental right. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126. He has made no
effort to do so. The United States Supreme Court did not hold the similar claim of a
biological father to be of constitutional significance, but instead considered the question of
whether a state may give categorical preference to the marital father over the biological
father to be a matter of public policy for the state to decide. See id. at 129-30.4

4

Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. was joined by Justice Rehnquist, and in all but
footnote 6, by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,
and wrote separately to distinguish the issues at hand as he saw them: first, is it
unconstitutional to prevent Michael from obtaining a judicial determination that he is her
biological father; and second, is it unconstitutional to deny Michael a fair opportunity to
prove that the child's best interests would be served by granting him visitation? See
Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110,132 (1989). As to the first question, Justice
Stevens wrote: "I agree with Justice Scalia that the Federal Constitution imposes no
obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the
requested declaration.' 'The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.'" |d.
at 133 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)). As to the second question,
Justice Stevens assumed for the purposes of his opinion that a constitutionally protected
family relationship might exist between Michael H. and his daughter. As distinct from this
case, Michael H.'s daughter identified Michael as her father, calling him "Daddy" id. at 144,
and the child's guardian ad litem asserted that she had more than one psychological or ofe
facto father and should be entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. Id. at 114. If
so, Justice Stevens concluded, the relationship was sufficiently protected by California law
that gave Michael H. the opportunity to prove his entitlement to visitation as "any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child." Id. at 133. Utah law also affords the
psychological parent of a child the right to seek visitation with the child. See Gribble v.
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Here, intervenor does not claim to be Zachary's
psychological parent (and it is undisputed that he is not and that petitioner is) and does not
seek rights in Zachary on any ground other than as would ensue from a judicial declaration
that he is Zachary's biological father. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
federal constitution does not entitle him to such relief.
33

The question is whether the relationship between a married woman, a man married
to another woman with whom she commits adultery, and a child born of that union into the
extant marriage of the woman and her husband, has been treated as a protected family unit
under the historic practices of our society. ]d. at 124. It is impossible to find that it has.
Historically, adultery has been treated as a crime, and it remains a crime in this state. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103. At common law, alienation of affection and criminal
conversation were widely recognized torts, the latter being directed specifically to adultery.
The tort of alienation of affection, by which liability may attach to a third person who
intentionally interferes with a marital relationship, retains continued validity in this state. See
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
Traditionally, society was so scornful of bringing children into the world as a result of
adulterous conduct that "bastardy" was also a crime. Utah's Bastardy Act was enacted in
1911 as part of the penal code and provided for the arrest and arraignment of the putative
father. Whereas the father of a child born out of wedlock historically had no parental rights
in his child, the husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times,
been protected by the presumption of legitimacy.
Consistent with the presumption of legitimacy and vindicating similar policies, Lord
Mansfield's Rule dates back to the common law of the eighteenth century, gained wide
acceptance in the jurisdiction of this country, and has continued application today in this
state. See In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). The rule forbids a husband or wife to
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give testimony that would that would tend to illegitimate their child, or for a court to consider
such evidence. See id. at 714 (holding court of appeals erred in relying on evidence that
contravened Lord Mansfield's rule). In 1777, Lord Mansfield said: "It is a rule founded in
decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say
after marriage that the offspring is spurious; or especially the mother, who is the offending
party." See Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974).
It is clear that our history and traditions demonstrate a resounding repugnance for
the conduct of fathering a child in the marriage of another man. It cannot be claimed to be a
"right" traditionally protected by our society and rooted in the history, tradition and the
conscience of our people. To the contrary, the conduct has been criminalized, the resulting
biological link accorded no protection, and the child and husband of the marriage protected
from such claims by longstanding, universally applicable laws with enduring application to
the present day.
Moreover, even if it were appropriate in this case to look at the liberty interest that
the trial court identified as "rights afforded to a natural parent" in isolation from both Father's
and Zachary's liberty interests that are necessarily implicated by those rights, which it is not,
Thanos's claim of constitutional protection would nevertheless fail. The extent to which an
unwed biological father's interest in parental rights in his child will acquire constitutional
protection depends on the extent to which the unwed father "demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by '[coming] forward to participate in the
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rearing of his child.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The interest the unwed
father has is an opportunity interest, which is lost when he fails to seize the moment and
permits another to assume the responsibility of meeting the child's needs. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.12(e) ("An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth.").
In InreD.B.S.. 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995), the court addressed the
constitutional claims of a man in Thanos's position who had not promptly asserted parental
rights in his child, but instead allowed the child's legal father to assume the role of father.
After the mother and legal father divorced, the biological father then married the child's
mother and argued that the relationship he subsequently developed with the child should be
accorded constitutional protection. The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
The court noted that the biological father had not been prevented from developing a
relationship with the child by the mother, but rather had agreed to "stay out of the picture."
Id. at 884. The court held: "[Ijn agreeing to [the mother's request] to stay out of the picture,
[the biological father] surrendered whatever constitutional opportunity he may have had to
develop a protected relationship with D.B.S. There is no authority to support the proposition
that having surrendered those rights he could later reclaim them by developing a stepfather
relationship after four years of providing no parental contact or support. We are justified, as
the United States Supreme Court did in Lehr. to hold that [the biological father's] interest in
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[the child] came too late to preserve any constitutional liberty interest. [The legal father]
voluntarily assumed the duties of paternity long before [the biological father] acted to secure
any rights. Therefore, without following the plurality opinion in Michael H„ but relying on the
total opinion of the United States Supreme Court therein, we hold the rights of [the
biological father] herein do not amount to a liberty interest sufficient to require that he be
granted the requested blood tests." Id.
Even in Texas, where the Texas Supreme Court held its statutory scheme denying
standing to an alleged biological father to assert paternity in a child born into the marriage of
another unconstitutional under the Texas constitution, the court emphasized that the
biological father must assert his interest near the time of the child's birth to preserve it. The
court held: "In a situation such as that presented here where the biological father does
assert his interest near the time of the child's birth, standing is constitutionally mandated if
he both 1) acknowledges responsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and
2) makes serious and continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." In re
J.W.T.. 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994).
In this state, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an unwed biological father's
opportunity interest in parenting his child is inchoate only and requires a demonstrated and
timely commitment to the responsibilities of parenting to warrant constitutional protection.
Cf. Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Services. 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (discussing cases
involving unwed father's opportunity interest). The fact that Thanos procreated with the wife
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of another man, rather than an unmarried woman, does not mean that he is thereby
afforded the luxury of choosing when he may decide it is convenient to come forward and
assert his interests. Rather, Section 30-1-17.2 of the Utah Code operates so that a child
born into the marriage of a man who is not his biological father is "immediately subject to a
de facto adoption by the mother's husband." Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128, fl 35.
There is indeed "no reason why a man who chooses to procreate with the wife of another
should be granted significant latitude to challenge the husband's de fact adoption, while one
who fails to timely establish his paternity of a child born to an unmarried woman is
permanently barred from doing so upon the mother's mere consent to the child's adoption."
Id.; see also Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County. 17 Cal. 4th 932 (Cal. 1998) ("A
man who wishes to father a child and ensure his relationship with that child can do so by
finding a partner, entering into a marriage, and undertaking the responsibilities marriage
imposes. One who instead fathers a child with a woman married to another man takes the
risk that the child will be raised within that marriage and that he will be excluded from
participation in the child's life.").
In this case, Thanos, with full knowledge of Mother's pregnancy, and believing the
child to be his from January 1999, took no steps whatsoever to come forward and shoulder
the burdens of fatherhood during the pregnancy, nor to establish a relationship with Zachary
after his birth. He did nothing, choosing to sit on whatever rights he may have had for two
years, until January 2001, when he filed a motion to intervene in the Pearsons' divorce
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action. He so conducted himself to maintain intact the deception of his wife. It was
Thanos's choice, and no one else's, to elevate his separate interests above Zachary's.
Though Thanos has now developed a healthy step-parent relationship with Zachary
(and Nicholas), he cannot reclaim the lost opportunity that he may have had to come
forward and act as Zachary's father. Zachary now has an established father, who is not
simply a fungible item capable of replacement at the convenience of another. See In re
Marriage of Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439,446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("The relationship of
father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak, used and unwanted."). The
Court of Appeals' application of the Schoolcraft standing analysis to the facts of this case
was not a denial of any constitutionally protected liberty interest extant in Thanos.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' REFERENCES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
OCTOBER 2001 ORDER ARE IMMATERIAL TO ITS OPINION
Petitioners complain about two references to the trial court's October 2001 order, at

paragraphs 25 and 26 of the opinion. Paragraph 26 refers to the findings in the October
2001 order that Father is the psychological father of Zachary, that Zachary had become
closely bonded with Father, that those bonds were critical, and that to permit Thanos to
establish his paternity of Zachary and be introduced at that point as a father figure in
Zachary's life would be disruptive to the child's stability. Paragraph 25 refers to the
undisputed fact that Thanos had little interest or involvement in Zachary's life until he was
approximately 16 months old, and notes that the trial court had recognized this in its
October 2001 order.
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Petitioners assert that these findings in the October 2001 order "were critical to the
Court of Appeals' Motion [sic] that Pete's involvement was both unnecessary and disruptive
to Zachary and Kelly's relationship." Brief of Appellants, at 51. This assertion is inaccurate.
In support of it, petitioners point to paragraph 28 of the opinion, which states, "In light of
those findings, we cannot say that Thanos's attack on [Zachary's] paternity would not have
been disruptive to [Zachary's] paternity relationship with Father and his expectations about
whom his father was." Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128, fl 28 (emphasis added).
Petitioners then make the false claim that "those findings" refers to the findings in the
October 2001 order. A cursory review of paragraph 28 makes clear, however, that "those
findings" refers to Dr. Sanders' findings in her May 13,2002 and August 26,2002 reports.
With the exception of the ultimate finding, namely, that to permit Thanos to establish
his paternity of Zachary would be disruptive, each of the findings in the October 2001 order
is confirmed in Dr. Sanders' reports. Dr. Sanders' reports were the sole and exclusive
supplementation of evidence between March 2002, when the trial court concluded that "the
current record is insufficient to adequately address [the policy consideration of protecting
children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity] as it applies to the
circumstances of this case" - and November 2002, when the trial court concluded that
"intervention is appropriate based upon Dr. Sanders [sic] review and report to this court in
regard to the parties and children in this action." R.982, fl 20. The Court of Appeals was in
as good a position as the trial court to review the reports, and did so, concluding based on
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the findings contained therein that Thanos should not have been permitted to intervene to
establish his paternity of Zachary, thus replacing Father as Zachary's legal father.
Any reference by the Court of Appeals to the October 2001 order, as opposed to the
November 2002 order, is completely immaterial, as the essential record facts remain the
same. The trial court did not "vacate" those facts, and did not vacate its findings. The Court
of Appeals properly applied those facts to the standing analysis set forth in Schoolcraft.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondent's petition for rehearing attempts to circumvent the plain language of the

Court of Appeals' opinion to create ambiguity where none exists. The opinion is not about
admissibility of evidence for one purpose or another, but legal parentage, which has
"inescapable consequences" for the trial court's custody orders. The opinion is clear: "The
trial court erred in applying the parental presumption in favor of Mother and against Father
in making its ultimate custody decisions regarding Z.P. Other aspects of the trial court's
supplemental decree of divorce also rely, explicitly or implicitly, on Thanos's paternity of
Z.P., and these aspects of the final order are also erroneous and must be revisited as
appropriate." Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, fflf 37-38.
In fact, every aspect of the trial court's custody determinations stem directly or
indirectly from the trial court's erroneous parentage determination and the presence of
Thanos as a contestant for custody resulting therefrom. The Rule 4-903 factors addressed
by the custody evaluator and set forth in the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 34 pertain to
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Father, Mother and Thanos, and consistently refer to all three as parties and contestants for
custody of not only Zachary, but also Nicholas. The legal and physical custody orders set
forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 44 through 47 - incorporated directly from the custody
evaluator's recommendations - award Thanos legal and physical custody rights in both
Zachary and Nicholas, conferring on him, together with Mother, a joint physical custody
access schedule in both children and decision-making rights in both children. Further, the
court's application of the parental presumption against Father in his claim for custody of
Zachary, at Finding of Fact No. 35, necessarily impacts Father's claim to custody of
Nicholas as well because the court found that Nicholas and Zachary are "best of friends"
and should not be separated. See Finding of Fact No. 34.b.
Peppered throughout the trial court's findings are additional references to parentage
of the children that clearly impacted the trial court's custody orders. An example of this is
the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 42, which states that Mother "is pivotal in this case in
that she is the biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine." Thus, the court
concludes, she has "the strongest inherent responsibility for all three of these children." See
Finding of Fact no. 42. This and other similar findings - which emphasize Mother's,
Father's, and Thanos's biological relationship with not only the children whose custody is at
issue, but a child born to Thanos and Mother while the custody litigation was pending formed the basis for the court's ultimate custody determinations.
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Mother's petition for rehearing asked the Court of Appeals to ignore the foregoing
and pretend that Thanos's presence in the case as Zachary's legal and biological father, the
evaluator's treatment of him as a contestant for custody of both Zachary and Nicholas and
concomitant treatment of Father as a "third party" with less "inherent responsibility" for his
children than Mother, made no difference in the trial court's custody orders. This argument
is disingenuous, and it is belied by the trial court's findings and the custody orders
themselves.
Clearly, it is impossible for the trial court to fairly evaluate Father's custody claims
without the benefit of a new trial and a new custody evaluation that treats only the
competing claims of Father and Mother as legal parents with equal "inherent responsibility"
for their two children, and equal rights of custody in their two children, and does not confer
on Thanos or any other third party the status of parent, nor permit Thanos or any other third
party to be evaluated as a contestant for custody of either child. Father is entitled to have
his custody claims in Nicholas and Zachary evaluated as the legal parent of both children,
putting him on equal legal footing in all respects with Mother. Anything less than this
unacceptably prejudices Father.
Petitioners' petition for rehearing also requested that the Court of Appeals "clarify"
that the trial court may rely upon its findings and Dr. Jill Sanders' custody evaluation in
considering revisions to its award of custody and parent-time on remand. The opinion is
clear that the trial court's findings that rely either implicitly or explicitly on Thanos's paternity

43

are erroneous and may not be relied upon by the trial court. Nevertheless, petitioners
asserted that the trial court should be permitted to consider the fact that she is married to
Zachary's biological father and that Zachary's "biological sister lives with his biological
parents." Petition for Rehearing, at 5, % 1.
Petitioners' argument in this regard must be understood clearly. Their premise is
that the trial court's findings are not erroneous because the trial court and the custody
evaluator could properly consider biology in awarding custody. The premise is faulty in two
respects. First, the trial court did not merely consider biology as a factor in its custody
findings and orders, but structured the entire custody case around parentage determinations
stemming from biology. Thus, the trial court allowed Thanos to participate in the litigation
as a contestant for custody of both Nicholas and Zachary and awarded him custody rights in
both children. This was because the trial court determined that Thanos was a parent. At
the same time, the trial did not place Father on equal footing with Mother in his custody
claims because it determined that Father was not a parent. The trial court's findings are
primarily about biology as it relates to parentage, not about biology as a factor to be
considered in determining custody.
Biology may be relevant to determine parentage, if parentage is at issue. However,
the Court of Appeals resolved the question of legal parentage, reversing the trial court's
biology-based determination. Legal parentage having been determined, biology is no longer
relevant to that inquiry. The vast majority of the trial court's findings regarding biology are
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therefore erroneous, either implicitly or explicitly conferring upon Thanos parental rights,
concomitant standing to sue for custody, and treating him as a full contestant for custody in
this litigation. As such, the findings may not be relied upon by the trial court, and the trial
court should not be instructed that they may.
Petitioners' premise that the trial court's findings are not erroneous is based,
secondarily, on her faulty assumption that biology is relevant to custody, independent of the
parentage determination. The custody evaluator, and the trial court in reliance on the
evaluator, did make findings that appear to consider biology as a factor directly relevant to
custody, independent of parentage issues. Thus, one of the principle findings of the trial
court - informing its award of primary custody of Nicholas to Mother - is that Mother is
"pivotal in this case in that she is the biological mother of both boys and their sister,
Madelaine" and that Father by implication has less "inherent responsibility" for his two
children (being biologically related to only one) than Mother has.
Mother should not be permitted to advance this argument on remand. Legal
parentage having been decided, biology plays no role in the custody determination, and is
not a factor to be considered in assessing Father's and Mother's respective custody claims
in their two children. This Court made this point clearly in Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d
760 (Utah 1985). The father in that case made the argument that Mother now makes, i.e.,
that the trial court should have considered his biological relationship to the minor child
whose custody was at issue, the mother having adopted the child, to elevate his custody
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claim over hers. This Court refused to do so, stating: "The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in giving overriding priority to the best interests of the child over the desires of
defendant. Without discounting or even questioning the strong affection defendant bears
for his son, plaintiff, as an adoptive mother, could well harbor feelings of equal intensity." ]d.
at 762.
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), decided the following year, this Court
emphasized that the best interests of the child analysis in custody cases should be "based
on function-related factors," not unnecessary and outdated stereotypes, such as the
maternal preference, jd. at 120.
Mother's argument that "biology" may be considered in determining custody equates
to a request that function-related factors approved by the case law of this jurisdiction over
the past 20 years be abandoned in favor of stereotypes and pre-conceived notions. Instead
of relying on the function-related factors that are observed within each family constellation,
the trial court would be free to speculate about "inherent responsibility" or other such
concepts, completely independent of each parent's actual relationship with his or her
children.
Petitioners argue, however, that consideration of biology is appropriate due to the
Hutchison factors set forth in Rule 4-903, and specifically, Rule 4-903's direction that
custody evaluators must consider "kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances
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stepparent status." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-903(5)(E)(vii). Petitioners misapprehend
the meaning of "kinship" in the context of Hutchison and Rule 4-903.
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), is a pivotal custody case in which
this Court catalogues factors that had been appropriately relied upon in previous custody
cases to determine the best interests of a child, citing one or more cases for each factor
identified. In one group, the court listed several factors relating "primarily to the child's
feelings or special needs." Id. at 41. In the second group, the court listed several factors
relating "primarily to the prospective custodians' character or status or to their capacity or
willingness to function as parents." ]d. The second group includes the factor "kinship", for
which only one case, namely, In re Cooper, 410 P.2d 475 (Utah 1966), is cited.
In re Cooper does not stand for the proposition that biology can be considered as a
factor in determining custody of a child between two legal parents. To the contrary, In re
Cooper involves the competing custody claims of two sets of non-parents. This Court
stated that in such cases, "all things else being equal, near relatives should generally be
given preference over nonrelatives." ]d. at 475. 5
Thus, it is clear that "kinship" as a factor involves the status of the prospective
custodian vis-a-vis the child where two nonparents are competing for custody of a child, or
where one parent is a step-parent, not a legal parent. Where the prospective custodians'

5

Nor is "kinship" equated with "biology", as step-parent status is explicitly included within
the kinship factor.
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status vis-a-vis the child is exactly the same - i.e., they are both legal parents of the child kinship is not a relevant factor.
Petitioners' request that it be treated as such anyway is contrary to Bonwich and
contrary to the principle that best interests of the child is to be determined based on
function-related factors. Mother should not be permitted to argue or remand, under the
guise of "kinship", that she is biologically related to both children, whereas Father is
biologically related to only one, and that this should somehow favor her in her custody
claim.
Petitioners also requested that the trial court be instructed that it may consider
Zachary's biological relationship with Thanos and Madeleine, the child born to Thanos and
Mother while this custody litigation was pending, in determining custody. Clearly, neither
Thanos nor Madeleine are contestants for custody of Nicholas and Zachary. Their
relationship vis-a-vis Nicholas and Zachary is relevant only in relation to Mother's claim for
custody of Nicholas and Zachary. Mother should not be permitted to circumvent the Court
of Appeals' opinion by obfuscating the clear consequences of it.
Nor should Mother be permitted to confound Nicholas and Zachary's functional
relationships with Thanos and Madeleine, which are relevant to the custody determination,
with Nicholas and Zachary's biological relationships to Thanos and Madeline, which are not.
While an evaluator and the trial court may and should look at the children's' functioning in
both Mothers' and Fathers' homes, which will include looking at the children's relationship
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with other individuals in those homes, this consideration has nothing to do with biology. If
Zachary is closer with his sister than Nicholas, this can be observed and commented upon,
and is not a question of mere speculation. "Biology" on the other hand, has no independent
relevance to functional relationships, as relationships may correspond in importance, or not,
with "blood ties". Consideration of "biology" as a factor can only invite speculation, which is
why "biology" has never been identified in any case in this jurisdiction as an appropriate
factor to be considered in resolving a custody dispute between two legal parents.6 Mother
should not be permitted to advance the argument on remand that it should be here.
Finally, petitioners impugn footnote 7 of the Court of Appeals opinion as
sanctioning a balancing test between parental rights and best interests in the context
of a custody determination. The footnote does not do so, but instead merely points
out that best interests does not control in the context of determining paternity where
paternity is contested. Instead, the test set forth in Schoolcraft controls, and this test
balances both child-related and adult-related factors. Thus, a custody evaluator's
best interests conclusions cannot be the exclusive basis for appropriate application
of the Schoolcraft test. Moreover, the Schoolcraft test is not to be applied in
determining custody, nor does Footnote 7 say that it should be.

6

It should also be noted that "kinship ties", including ties to a sibling of a subsequent
marriage, have been held to constitute a "relatively unimportant" factor in the overall custody
determination. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, % 36, 989 P.2d 491.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should (1) affirm the Court of Appeals reversal
of the trial court's ruling permitting Thanos to intervene in this case, (2) hold that Thanos
does not have standing to challenge Zachary's paternity, (3) affirm the Court of Appeals'
denial of petitioner's petition for rehearing, and (4) instruct the trial court on remand that
Father is to have his custody claims evaluated in a new custody evaluation and trial wherein
he and Mother compete for custody on equal footing and biology is not considered as a
factor for any purpose in resolving Mother's and Father's competing custody claims.
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